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A Change of Ideas: A Case Study on the Security-Privacy Shift 
in the EU Data Retention Directive 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On March 11th 2015, a Dutch judge struck down the data retention law active in the 
Netherlands since 20091. In the verdict, the judge ruled that the law did not sufficiently 
protect the right to privacy of individual citizens, and did not provide adequate 
safeguards to prevent the law from being used to fight any type of crime rather than the 
severe crimes the law was supposed to be used for2. In a noteworthy section of the 
judgement, the judge stated the Dutch law on data retention was implemented as a 
consequence of the European Union’s Data Retention Directive (DRD). This Directive, 
issued on March 15th 2006, aimed to “harmonize Member States’ provisions concerning 
the obligations of publically available electronic communication devices or of public 
communications networks with respect to the retention of certain data which are 
generated or processed by them, in order to ensure that the data are available for the 
purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by 
each member state in its national law” (DRD 2006: 3).  
 Although much of the text in the DRD explicitly mentions the European 
Parliament’s concern for its citizens’ privacy, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) struck down the directive on April 8th 2014. In the ruling, the Court states that 
the DRD adversely affected the essence of both the fundamental right to privacy and the 
protection of data (CJEU 2014-I: 1). The final verdict saw the DRD declared invalid, 
noting “the Court is of the opinion that by adopting the [DRD], the EU legislature has 
exceeded the limits imposed by its compliance with the principle of proportionality” 
(CJEU 2014-I: 2). In other words, the judge ruled the DRD had created an environment 
in which the citizens of the European Union would feel subject to constant surveillance 
so long as the directive was in effect.  
  
While the Court of Justice of the European Union’s ruling immediately invalidated the 
European requirement for data retention amongst Member States, the judgement had no 
                                                        
1 http://www.nu.nl/files/nutech/Uitspraakbewaarplicht.pdf  
2 http://www.nu.nl/files/nutech/Uitspraakbewaarplicht.pdf (Pages 10-11) 
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direct effect on laws passed at the national level. Thus Member States that had 
transposed the directive into national law still had regulations adopted in order to comply 
with the DRD on the books after the Data Retention Directive was ruled invalid. As 
digital civil liberties NGO he Electronic Frontier Foundation noted: “The Data 
Retention is now gone in every member state, but the challenge of implementing that 
decision in the individual states still remains” 3 . However, the ruling does provide 
organizations or individuals concerned with privacy with an opportunity to challenge 
these national laws on data retention. This was the case in the Netherlands, where an 
alliance of journalists, lawyers, privacy groups and telecom companies sued the Dutch 
government in order to remove the data retention laws4.  
The DRD was adopted in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on Madrid and 
London in 2004 and 2005, respectively. Presented as a measure that allowed law 
enforcement to possibly prevent future attacks, the Directive was adopted remarkably 
quickly, moving from first being mentioned as a possible measure in 2004 (European 
Commission 2004: 4-5), to draft proposal5 in December 2005 and being adopted as a 
Directive in March 2006 (DRD 2006).  
The DRD was issued as an amendment to the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications, better known as the e-Privacy Directive. Issued in 2002, the e-Privacy 
Directive’s article 15 allowed EU Member States to create data retention programmes at 
the national level, allowing for the retention of user data: “when such a restriction 
constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic 
society to safeguard national security (i.e. State security), defence, public security, and 
the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offenses or 
unauthorised use of the electronic communications system (…) To this end, Member 
States may, inter alia, adopt legislative measures providing for the retention of data for a 
limited period justified on the grounds laid down in this paragraph”6  
Although a direct amendment to the e-Privacy Directive, the Data Retention 
Directive includes no privacy safeguards in its body text, merely stating that it “respects 
the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognized, in particular, by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In particular this directive (…) 
                                                        
3 https://www.eff.org/node/81899  
4 http://www.nu.nl/files/nutech/Uitspraakbewaarplicht.pdf (page 1) 
5 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005PC0438&from=EN 
6 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:en:HTML  
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seeks to ensure full compliance with citizens fundamental rights (…) as enshrined in 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter” (DRD 2006: 3). In Court of Justice would later rule that 
the DRD presented “A particularly serious interference with the right to privacy” (CJEU 
2014-II). In delivering its verdict, the Court judged that “it must be held that by adopting 
[the Data Retention Directive], the EU legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by 
compliance with the principle of proportionality in the light of articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of 
the Charter [of Fundamental Rights]” (CJEU 2014-II).  
 
From the very start in 2005, the DRD has been subject of controversy; during its passing 
privacy and civil liberties organisations dubbed it the ‘big brother anti-privacy law’7. After 
it passed, it was challenged in court twice: unsuccessfully by two Member States of the 
EU who argued it was adopted on a wrongful legal basis, and successfully by Digital 
Rights Ireland, a civil liberties organisation, on its content (Granger and Irion 2014: 838, 
839).  
In 2013, an effort to demonstrate the usefulness of the Date Retention Directive 
led the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG Home) to publish a 
document called ‘Evidence for the necessity of data retention in the EU’. The document 
aims to “demonstrate the value to criminal investigation and persecution of 
communications retained under the [DRD]” (DG Home 2013: 2). The document 
presents a number of cases pertaining to various serious criminal activities, which have 
been addressed using data provided under the DRD. However, keeping in mind the 
DRD was passed as an anti-terrorism measure, the breakdown of the evidence document 
presented below in table 1 shows that the Directive has only been used to fight terrorism 
in about 6% of the cases the DG Home presented as evidence of DRD usefulness.  
 
  
                                                        
7 http://press.ffii.org/Press%20releases/EU%20introducing%20%22Big%20Brother%22%20anti-
privacy%20law%2C%20warns%20FFII  
Table 1 Evidence of DRD usefulness breakdown (DG Home 2013) 
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Though the other categories are also serious crimes, the primary and oft-repeated 
raison d’être of DRD was the capability of the directive to help law enforcement agencies 
fight terrorism, which (according to the evidence provided by to the DG Home by the 
member states themselves) is nowhere near the most common subject for which it is 
used. Additionally, the five cases presented as evidence that DRD helps to fight terrorism 
are not especially impressive: in three cases the data retained was insufficient and led 
nowhere, one led to a single arrest. In fact, in only one case, the investigation of the 
London bombings, the data retained allowed law enforcement to arrest a number of 
accomplices of the five terrorists who planted the bombs (DG HOME 2013: 9-10).  
 
The passing, activity, and invalidation of the Data Retention Directive provides an 
interesting case, in which we see the adoption of a Directive by the EU in 2006 which 
ends less than a decade later with a decision by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. In its decision, the CJEU expresses concern about the complete lack of privacy 
safeguards in the Directive, deeming the entire Directive to be in incompatible with the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (CJEU 2014-II). This lack of safeguards had also been 
noted throughout the DRD’s period of activity by privacy and civil rights organisations, 
as well as EU-affiliated privacy supervisors. Under normal circumstances, the EU seeks a 
balance between the need for privacy and security, consulting with both civil liberties 
organisations and law enforcement agencies. In the case of the DRD however, the ruling 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union makes clear that this balance was 
completely absent in the Directive.  
Category # Of cases % Of total 
Terrorism 5 6,1 
Manslaughter/Murder 21 25,6 
Buying/Offering Child Pornography 9 10,9 
Drug Trafficking 6 7,3 
Armed Robbery 6 7,3 
Burglary, Theft, Organized Trafficking 24 29,3 
Cybercrime 5 6,1 
Fraud 6 7,3 
TOTAL 82 100 
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As will be discussed later on, the passing of laws requiring some measure of 
surveillance of the public are a constant balancing act between competing narratives of 
security and privacy. Neither narrative is without merit, and actors that prefer one to the 
other represent each. This is not to say that the two narratives are wholly incompatible. A 
law enforcement agency, for instance, would obviously prefer greater security to greater 
privacy. Though clearly an actor that prefers the security narrative, it does not follow that 
it desires the abolition of privacy: rather, the security actor would argue that to do the 
work it is required to do by nature of being a law enforcement agency, sacrifices to 
individual privacy may have to be made. Similarly, a privacy watchdog may prefer 
protecting privacy to greater security in general, but is not opposed to any and all security 
measures in all cases. These two narratives compete with each other to determine if 
regulation favours security over privacy or vice versa. It is a competition that usually 
results in small victories and losses for each side.  
In the case of DRD however, the balance at the Directive’s passing appears to 
have swung radically in favour of the security narrative, resulting in a Directive that 
allowed for blanket surveillance of all EU citizens with hardly any privacy safeguards in 
place. Eight years later, a court decision ruled in favour of civil liberty organisation 
Digital Rights Ireland, invalidating the Directive in its entirety. At some point during the 
eight years of the DRD’s existence, the dominance of the security narrative exemplified 
in the passing of the DRD had waned, allowing for the privacy narrative to regain its 
position and correct the imbalance between the two narratives.  
 
2. Literature review 
 
The debate can perhaps be more accurately described as a dialogue between two sides 
that approach the same problem from different angles. On the one side, there is the 
method of Securitization (or Copenhagen School) theorists, such as Ole Wæver and 
Barry Buzan, who come from a political science (specifically structural realists) 
background and the International Political Sociology (or Paris School). The Paris school 
scholars, such as Huysmans and Bigo, approach Security issues from a more sociological 
angle, following in the tradition of 20th century by French scholars Michel Foucault and 
Pierre Bourdieu (Bigo 2008: 127).  
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Three schools of thought exist within Security Theory, commonly referred to as the 
Paris, Copenhagen and Welsh Schools. For the sake of clarity and brevity, within this 
literature review the Welsh School will not be discussed in any depth, in part because as 
Floyd (2007) has pointed out, the differences between the Welsh and Copenhagen 
Schools lie not at a mechanical or even conceptual level. The difference between the two 
boils down to one (Welsh) concerning itself with a normative aspect of security and 
securitization, whereas the other (Copenhagen) avoids any normative statements on 
principle. Floyd contends that the two schools are compatible in the sense that significant 
common ground can be found between them “It can be concluded that securitisation and 
desecuritization are neither always good, nor always bad. Because this is so, both the 
Copenhagen School and the Welsh School are valuable in analysing security issues and 
answering the problem of why and when to make/not make normative statements 
regarding its practice” (Floyd 2007: 349). Floyd bases her claim in part on quotes taken 
from various works of Copenhagen School scholar Ole Wæver, noting: “Wæver’s 
assertion that the two schools might be complementary is crucial (…) it implies that a 
strategy in which the two approaches were combined would be a good thing” (Floyd 
2007: 336). The point Floyd argues isn’t that there no distinction exists between the 
Welsh and Copenhagen Schools, rather, save for the willingness to make or not make 
normative statements about securitization, the two can be considered complimentary 
rather than adversarial.  
 The differences between the Paris and Copenhagen Schools are much more 
pronounced than the ones between Copenhagen and Wales. Ole Wæver, one of the 
primary authors within the Copenhagen School, described securitization as a way for 
representatives to allow themselves to act without the regular limitations on their actions: 
“By uttering ‘security’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a 
specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to 
block it” (1995: 55). Utterance in this context is quite literal: speech acts are a vital cog in 
the securitization mechanism as perceived by the Copenhagen School. Speech acts allow 
political actors to move certain measures and topics into the realm of security, in which 
they have more capabilities to act. In a 1998 article, Wæver, Buzan and De Wilde argued 
that a successful speech act establishing securitization hinges on the internal grammatical 
form of the act, the authority of the speaker over his audience, and the beneficial or 
detrimental features of the alleged threats (1998: 33). Thus, for the Copenhagen School, 
securitization is a process in which political actors, through speech acts, move specific 
 9 
topics into a security context. They do this because in the context of security, the public 
will allow them to do much more then they would permit normally. Securitization, as 
Wæver notes in a 2011 article, is a process of justifying extraordinary measures by using 
a successful speech act to create a threat argument. Such an argument can only be 
successful if: “it [establishes] (1) that there is a threat; (2) that the threat is potentially 
existential; and (3) the possibility and relative advantages of security handling compared 
to non-securitized handling” (Wæver 2011: 473).  
 The Copenhagen School argues individual agents, through speech acts, perform 
securitization. By using speech acts, individual agents (if successful) change the structure 
of the political sphere around them: “The structure of securitization theory is organized 
around securitization as an act, as a productive moment, as a discontinuous 
reconfiguration of a social state” (Wæver 2011: 468). According to Copenhagen School 
scholars, individual actors are able to securitize subjects by successfully performing 
speech acts. These acts allow political actors to “Break the normal political rules of the 
game” (Buzan et al. 1998: 24).  
 
The Paris School, in contrast, focuses much more on the structural or techno-
bureaucratic side of security. In criticizing the Copenhagen Schools’ focus on agent acts, 
Huysmans (2011) argues that Copenhagen’s speech act-focused approach essentially 
misses the forest for the trees, choosing to concentrate on single moments (the speech act) 
rather than the process that lies behind it: “Speech acts of security enact a sharp 
distinction between the exceptional and the banal, the political and the everyday, the 
routine and the creative” (Huysmans 2011: 375). Huysmans argues that such an 
approach focuses too much on the elites (the politicians who carry out speech acts) and 
not enough on the everyday bureaucratic process that lies behind them. Rather than 
focussing on the exceptional, rapturous moments, Huysmans concentrates on the process of 
securitization: “From the perspective of ‘speech acts’, this associating will mostly look 
unspectacular, unexceptional, continuous and repetitive; instead of speech acts, we get 
the securitizing ‘work’ of a multiplicity of little security nothings (…) the [source] 
changes from a security speech act to one of many elements that (…) appear as little 
security nothings – that is, devices, sites, practices without exceptional significance. Yet, 
these little security nothings are highly significant, since it is they rather than exceptional 
speech acts that create the securitizing process” (Huysmans 2011: 377-8).  
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 To the Paris School, the process of securitization may then very well include 
speech acts of exceptional impact, however the staying power of the measures 
implemented relies on the securitization process more than it does on the securitization 
moment. In other words, as Didier Bigo puts it: “the [process] has not only to do with a 
successful political speech act transforming the decision-making process and generating 
politics of exception often favouring coercive options (…) It has more to do with more 
mundane bureaucratic decisions of everyday politics…” (2008: 126).  
 To be sure, agency is not unimportant within the Paris School, but it is certainly of 
lesser importance than the structure agents find themselves in. This structure, or ‘field’ as 
Bigo defines it, is key in determining which way agents attempt to direct security debates: 
“We consider [the unfavourable balancing of freedoms in democracy] as the result of the 
very functioning of a solidly constituted security field of professionals of managing of 
unease, both public and private, working together transnationally along professional lines 
mainly in European and Transatlantic ‘working groups’” (Bigo & Tsoukala 2008: 4).  
 
Thus, while the Copenhagen School’s securitization narrative is more geared towards 
singular moments or acts, the Paris school (or International Political Sociology) contends 
that these moments of influence are simply a by-product of a larger undercurrent, a 
process of gradual and constant (in)securitization. Bigo brings the difference between the 
two schools into sharp focus when he writes: “The social and political construction of 
(in)security is then related to the political as such and to the enunciation of the discourses 
as elevating events into political problems, but they are not limited to politicians and 
political parties and their claims for exceptional measures in the political spectacle. They 
are more deeply rooted in society” (2008: 127).  
 For the purposes of this research, the Paris School version of security theory will 
be used to analyse the events surrounding the Data Retention Directive. As shown in the 
introduction, two fields of professionals are present in the context of the DRD. On one 
side, there are law enforcement agencies and political actors who favour security over 
privacy, willing to create legislation that sacrifices some degree of privacy to obtain a 
greater amount of security capabilities. On the other side, professionals who favour 
privacy over security, seeking to increase safeguards of individual privacy, and are 
unwilling to accept that greater security should come at the cost of privacy. As Bigo 
noted, the European Union is one of the prime examples wherein experts from the fields 
of (in)security have been able to become “professionals of management of threat or even 
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unease” (2008: 127). Considering the EU, by its very nature, is more bureaucratic and 
technocratic than it is democratic, thus making the framework provided by the Paris 
School a useful tool for analysis. Therefore, following Security Theory as interpreted by 
the Paris School provides a much more practical and straightforward way of studying the 
EU legislative process.   
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
As the literature review section made clear, the central idea that differentiates IPS from 
Securitization (or Paris from Copenhagen) is how each school interprets the how actors 
create (in)security. In the simplest of terms, Copenhagen argues this establishment 
happens in eruptive fashion, by a key actor successfully performing a speech act. Paris 
argues instead that insecurity is the end result of a long process, a narrative built by 
agents of (in)security that rely on both personal authority as well as the authority of their 
field.  
In the Paris School literature, Bigo describes security in the context of IPS as 
follows: “for an IPS of security, the key questions are: who is doing an (in)securitization 
move, under what conditions, towards whom and with what consequences (…) For the 
Paris School, in (in)securitization process has not only to do with successful political 
speech acts transforming he decision-making process and generating politics of exception 
often favouring coercive options (…) it has to do with the more mundane bureaucratic 
decisions of everyday politics (...) [and] use of technologies, especially the ones which 
permit communication and surveillance at a distance through databases and spread of 
exchange of information” (2008: 125-6). Within DRD, the ‘agents of (in)security’ are 
those pushing the security narrative in favour of the privacy narrative, primarily the 
members of the PEDR expert group and national governments such as the United 
Kingdom, whose representatives pushed for the Europe-wide rules as early as 20058.  
The agents of (in)security function within a context of both a field and a habitus. 
Field, as described by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, is a collective created by a 
number of individual agents with a similar interest, but not necessarily a similar goal 
(Bigo 2011: 238-241). It is a system of social positions within which agents are structured 
                                                        
8 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100202100434/http://www.eu2005.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPag
e&c=Page&cid=1107293391098&a=Karticle&aid=1115136955496   
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according to power relations. At the same time, each actor in a field has an own habitus, 
the specific life trajectory and lived experience in different fields that “creates a unique 
practical sense that no one can exactly share with him/her. The person in this sense is 
unique” (Bigo 2011: 241). The habitus of each agent creates a disposition that agent 
employs in his day-to-day existence in the field, while at the same time the field itself has 
an influence on the agent’s habitus as the lived experience in the field factors into the 
agent’s habitus (2011: 242).  
Bigo goes on to describe how Bourdieu considers the state itself a field, or more 
accurately, a meta-field (2011: 246). Bigo writes: “[Bourdieu] uses the metaphor or a 
meta-field in order to describe the state as a locus where different elites coming from 
various social fields struggle to control access to the conversion rate between the different 
forms of capital they have accumulated” (2011:246). It is by identifying the state as a 
meta-field, in which professionals from different field come to struggle to exchange the 
resources they have gathered in their original field to obtain whatever resource they 
desire in the meta-field that the sociologist Bourdieu becomes relevant for political 
scientists. Bigo notes that “the European Union is certainly a place where the intensity of 
the struggles is the most visible as it has resulted in more official institutions in terms of 
permanent organizations and operational agencies” (Bigo 2011: 250). According to this 
interpretation, professionals from various fields would come into the EU to exchange 
whatever resources they have accumulated in their respective field in an effort to 
exchange that currency for the resources the transnational meta-field has to offer.   
 
Bigo also notes that security field agents of (in)security tend to be especially powerful at 
the transnational level, where international cooperation through informal clubs have 
permitted certain actors, such as transnational law enforcement agencies, to 
“[accumulate] specific symbolic capital over information concerning risk and threats”  
(Bigo 2011: 248). This is also the case with Data Retention Directive, where we have 
seen the initial dominance of the professionals from the field of security. However, with 
the striking down of the DRD, a de-(in)securitization has taken place, which according to 
Bigo would be due to an opposing field of professionals gaining ground: “security and 
insecurity are the results of an (in)securitization process achieved by a successful claim 
resulting from the struggles between actors in a field…” (2008: 128). In other words, in 
2005-2006, professionals from a field of security, who offered a resource of security, won 
the struggle for resource conversion in the meta-field of the European Union. However, 
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as time passed, professionals from a field of privacy gained the upper hand in the struggle 
and their resource, privacy, gained the favour of the meta-field.  
The eventual demise of DRD at the hands of the Court of Justice, a decision 
prompted by privacy watchdogs Digital Rights Ireland, was a victory for the 
professionals in the field of privacy. In terms of IPS, the ruling by the Court of Justice 
was the culmination of a process of de-(in)securitization, described by Bigo in 2008 as a 
very difficult one: “Unmaking (in)security would then entail the disruption of the ‘regime 
of truth’ created by the professionals of (in)security about their categories…” (2008: 128).  
 
4. Research Question 
 
In this research, the focus lies on two fields of professionals who are both trying to 
influence the European Union meta-field. First, there are the professionals of security, 
law enforcement agencies, represented by powerful state representatives at the EU level. 
As a group, these professionals offer a resource of security to the EU, which they offer 
through use of a security narrative that simultaneously presents a problem and a solution 
to the meta-field. The problem they present is insecurity: the threat of terrorism and 
serious transnational crime. The solution is increased security measures coming at the 
dual cost of the resource of privacy and money. The professionals of the security 
narrative join forces at the International level to increase the value of the resource they 
offer, a combined narrative shared by a multitude of security professionals with each a 
great degree of power within their respective field allows them both greater access to and 
power in the struggle in the meta-field of the European Union.  
 The second field of professionals comes from the field of privacy. Their collective 
resource is diametrically opposed to the one offered by the security professionals, privacy 
is what they seek to deliver to the meta-field in exchange for security and greater civil 
rights. The professionals from the field of privacy define security in a different way than 
the professionals of security do. To the professionals of privacy, the threat they face is 
coming from the security professionals, whose desire to take their resource of privacy in 
exchange for their own security resource and money. Like the professionals of security, 
to gain more strength in the struggle in the meta-field, the professionals of privacy join in 
a collective narrative of privacy in order to reach their goal.  
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The level at which these two collectives of professionals struggle is the meta-field of the 
European Union, which offers a great deal of in-field power and money to whichever 
narrative manages to emerge from the meta-field struggle, in addition to whichever 
resource in terms of legislative power the dominant field desires.  
 In other words, at the international level, various law enforcement agencies work 
together in spite of internal differences, so their collective strength and shared narrative 
forms a more convincing force pushing forward the narrative that the threat of terrorism 
and crime to the citizens of the European Union warrants expansion of their security 
capabilities. At the same time, privacy watchdogs and Data Protection agencies also 
band together in order to improve their own strength and credibility in voicing a shared 
narrative that the civil rights of the citizens of the EU are under threat.  
 
The purpose of this research is to examine the two narratives of security and privacy 
using the 2006 Directive on Data Retention as a case study. By focussing on the activities 
of the security and privacy narratives with regards to the DRD before, during and after its 
existence, this research aims is to find how, when and why the change in dominant field 
from security to privacy occurred. Upon its completion, this research aims to answer the 
following question: How has shift from the security narrative to the privacy narrative 
caused the demise of the Directive on Data Retention?  
 
5. Hypothesis 
 
Returning briefly to Didier Bigo’s 2008 article in which he states that the DRD’s 
establishment and implementation was the end result of a process of (in)securitization by 
(in)security professionals, and its eventual invalidation was the end result of what Bigo 
calls an unmaking of (in)security through a disruption of the agents of (in)security’s 
‘regime of truth’ (2011: 128). The hypothesis of this research is that the Court decision 
that ended the Data Retention Directive in 2014 was the result of the EU meta-field’s 
gradual shift away from the collective narrative of security professionals and towards the 
collective narrative of privacy professionals.  
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6. Methodology 
 
In order to deconstruct the collective narratives used by the professionals from the fields 
of privacy and security, this research will concentrate on both collectives presented their 
narratives. Thus, how did the security professionals justify the creation and continued 
existence of the DRD? At the same time, in what way did those on the privacy 
professionals denounce the DRD?  
 This does not mean this research will include a discourse analysis. No single 
speech act uttered or document produced by either side has constituted the gradual shift 
from security to privacy. Instead, this research will seek to provide a chronological 
overview of each narrative’s development over time, and map the Commissions reactions 
to these developments. Using the reports issued by both privacy watchdogs and law 
enforcement agencies, it will be possible to see the narrative change in direction that 
occurred over time with regards to the dominant narrative. A discourse analysis of the 
speech act that ended the DRD, the Court of Justice ruling in 2014, would be to miss a 
narrative forest for a single tree. Instead, this research will seek to tell the story of DRD 
from both the security and privacy professionals’ points of view, tracking each narrative’s 
progress over time in order to understand how the narrative shift occurred.  
 
All the data this research uses to map the narratives of security and privacy professionals 
is available online, either through the European Union’s website or on the involved 
organizations’ own web pages. Since both sides publish all their opinions in an effort to 
strengthen their case by influencing public opinion, there is no shortage of available 
official documents and sources. In lieu of first-hand accounts, the inception (2006), 
evaluation (2011) and demise (2014) of the DRD generated an ample amount of 
material, with both narrative sides either acting or reacting in some way to the goings-on 
at the European meta-field level.  
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7. The Security Narrative 
 
7.1. The Actors  
Security narrative proponents mostly law enforcement agencies or political actors 
charged with the security of the European Union. Throughout the Data Retention 
Directive’s active period, these law enforcement agencies and the member states that 
represent them on the European level, have defended the Directive even while 
acknowledging it had flaws. However, not all members of the EU have been equally 
supportive. The main driving force behind the passing of the DRD has been the United 
Kingdom, the only EU member to have a data retention law in place prior to the passing 
of the European directive.  
 In a number of communications from the European Commission, it is made clear 
that the DRD enjoyed continued and on-going support from many member states. In a 
publication aimed to explain the value of DRD to law enforcement, the DG Home 
website states that “member states have generally reported that retained data is very 
valuable, and in some cases indispensable, for preventing and combating crime, for 
protecting victims and for acquittal of the innocent in criminal cases.”9Functioning as the 
representative body of various European (and by extension national) law enforcement 
agencies to the European Commission, the Directorate-General Migration and Home 
Affairs has been a vocal defender of the DRD’s use and legality. The stated goal of the 
DG Home is providing a stable, lawful and secure environment in which the EU can 
pursue economic, cultural and social growth10. In practice, the DG Home aims to create 
a more harmonized and cooperating law enforcement framework at the European level, 
both with regards to building a common immigration and asylum policy and fighting 
terrorism and serious crime.  
 Another major actor, the Member States of the European Union, are presented by 
both the DG Home and the European Commission as being generally in favour of the 
DRD. This can mostly be attributed to the fact that most national law enforcement 
agencies welcome any and all tools they receive to enforce law more effectively. This is 
not to say that DRD support was unanimous, the 2011 evaluation report written by the 
European Commission notes that several member states (the Czech Republic, Germany, 
                                                        
9 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-251_en.htm?locale=en  
10 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/who-we-are/about-us/index_en.htm  
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Austria, Romania and Sweden) had failed to transpose the DRD into national law or had 
constitutional courts annul the transposed laws that were passed (EC 2011: 5-6, 20-1). 
The government of Ireland challenged the DRD in the Court of European Justice 
following its passing in 2006, arguing it had been passed on a wrong legal basis since it 
was presented as an internal market measure (part of the first pillar of the EU) rather than 
a law enforcement measure (part of the third pillar of the EU). The Court of Justice 
disagreed with the Irish argument in 2009 (Granger and Irion 2014: 838).  
At the same time, Data Retention efforts saw strong and vocal support from the 
United Kingdom, Denmark and France. In the wake of the invalidation of DRD, the 
commitment of especially the United Kingdom to the idea of retaining data has been 
clear. In July of 2014, the UK government very quickly passed the Data Retention and 
Investigative Powers (DRIP) Act, restoring the data retention regime in the UK. In a 
response to the European Court of Justice ruling on DRD, the Government states: 
“Although the Court criticised elements of the [DRD], it did not consider the robust 
safeguards that already exist in the UK’s communications data regime. (…) We believe 
our internationally-respected retention and access regime already addresses many of the 
[CJEU]’s criticisms.” 11  Critics, such as Cambridge University law and technology 
researcher Julia Prowles, have called the DRIP Act “an affront to  democracy, the 
rule of law, to the rights of British and global citizens, and even to the erstwhile ends of 
national security.”12 
 
The security narrative is used by powerful, influential and well-funded actors, who are 
charged with either law enforcement or the protection of European citizens from crime 
and terrorism. Because of their assigned task, they frequently support security policies 
privacy-minded critics find intrusive or overreaching. While critics believe some of these 
policies threaten the right to privacy, the actors who use the security narrative consider 
them useful tools, which allow law enforcement to more effectively fight and prevent 
criminal activity in the European Union. 
 
7.2. Security, Preservation and Retention 
                                                        
11 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/331106/DRIPgovern
mentNoteECJjudgment.pdf  
12 www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/18/uk-drip-ripa-law-sceptical-misleading-democracy-
martha-lane-fox  
 18 
The Data Retention Directive came into force in 2006, shortly after the terrorist attacks 
in Madrid of 2004 and London of 2005. Though certainly an important factor in the 
eventual passing of the directive as a counter-terrorism measure, the attacks on Madrid 
and London were not the starting point for the idea of data retention. In 1997, at the 
behest of law enforcement agencies and security professionals (Guild and Carrera 2014: 
2), the EU passed directive 97/66, allowing member states to restrict the privacy rights of 
citizens when “such restriction constitutes a necessary measure to safeguard national 
security, defence, public security, the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution 
of criminal offences or of unauthorized use of the telecommunications system.” 13 
Directive 97/66 thus allowed member states to create legislation that allowed for the 
preservation of data at the national level.  
 Data preservation means law enforcement has the right to ask 
telecommunications companies to preserve user data, including the content of that data, 
if a judge deems it necessary for a criminal investigation. International harmonization of 
data preservation laws followed in 2001, when the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime 
(BCC) resulted in a treaty seeking to create a unified data preservation policy amongst its 
signatories. The BCC entered into force in 2004 and has been signed by nearly all 
members of the Council of Europe as well as a number of non-members including 
Canada, Japan and the United States of America14. In some ways, data preservation goes 
further than data retention under the DRD did, allowing for the content of 
communications to be stored rather than user metadata only. However, as the Centre for 
Strategy & Evaluation Services (CSES) notes in a report highlighting the relationship 
between data preservation and data retention: “Data preservation is often considered to 
be less intrusive than data retention, since it is used in relation to specific suspects and 
provides a snapshot of the situation, rather than obliging operators to retain data for all 
users” (CSES 2012: 22). The report by CSES also clarifies why law enforcement 
agencies, and by extension the EU member states, find data retention policies so useful, 
noting: “data retention plays a role in insuring that data is being kept and (…) this is 
sometimes a prerequisite for data preservation, as data may have already been deleted 
before a data preservation order is issued” (2012: 25).  
Like DRD, the BCC has been criticized by privacy watchdogs and data protection 
agencies for lacking proper safeguards; with a EU-affiliated data protection agency noting 
                                                        
13 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997L0066:EN:HTML (art. 14) 
14 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG  
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the draft text of the convention lacks clarity as well as essential safeguards of 
fundamental rights (AWP 2001: 8). In spite of the criticism, the BCC has been signed by 
nearly all Council of Europe members and has bee in force since 2004. The relationship 
between the data retention and preservation as detailed in the CSES report shows that 
law enforcement agencies view the two policies as complimentary: data retention ensures 
that a certain data is already preserved even when the data preservation has not been 
approved by a judge, at the same time data preservation allows for retained data to be 
stored longer than the DRD specifies if the data proves useful to an investigation (CSES 
2012: 25-6). The CSES report uses table 2 to illustrate the nature of the differences 
between data preservation and retention.  
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Table 2: Differences between data preservation and data retention under the DRD (CSES 2012: 24) 
Element Preservation Retention 
Aim Expedited preservation of 
volatile evidence to allow 
for time for formal 
measures to obtain 
evidence 
Ensure that data is 
available for investigation, 
detection and prosecution 
of serious crime 
Mechanism for 
maintaining data 
Order preservation of 
specified data 
Automatic retention of 
data 
Type of data covered Stored computer data Traffic data, location data 
and subscriber information 
Coverage of crime Any crime Serious crime as defined 
under national law 
Actor required to store data Any physical or legal 
person 
Publically available 
communications service 
and network providers 
 
According to Guild and Carrera, the crucial difference that would allow data 
preservation to continue but ultimately sank data retention lies in the authorization 
component. While the BCC requires a law enforcement agency to seek judicial approval 
for data preservation, the DRD “(…) permits member states to allow access to data 
retained by whatever competent law enforcement agency it chooses (…) There is no need 
for states to make access subject to judicial scrutiny. These are among the aspects of data 
retention that have caused most concern, as it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
retention of the data is arbitrary and access to it is unlimited” (2014: 3).   
 In the European Court of Justice’s ruling of April 2014, one of the main 
arguments used by the court to invalidate the DRD in its entirety was the discrepancy 
between the results and the methods of obtaining those results. Proportionality of the 
means of investigation, which is constrained by judicial scrutiny in the case of data 
preservation, was insufficiently safeguarded in the Data Retention Directive. Thus, in 
spite of being deemed a useful tool, deemed invaluable some law enforcement agencies, 
DRD was invalidated while the Convention on Cybercrime continues to gather 
signatories and ratifications.  
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7.3. Security Narrative Timeline 
The desire and duty of states to protect citizens from criminal activity is as old as the 
concept of government itself. The first time this desire moved towards the digital realm 
comes in 1997, when the European Parliament passed Directive 97/66/EC concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications 
sector. In article 14 of Directive 97/66/EC, members of the EU were given the right, but 
not the duty, to set up their own data retention programmes. Following the passing of 
97/66/EC, harmonizing the different national laws at the EU level became a theme for 
law enforcement agencies (Guild and Carrera 2014: 2). In 2002, the growing popularity 
and availability of the Internet led the EU to adopt Directive 2002/58/EC, or the E-
Privacy Directive, which expanded member states’ abilities to retain data from 
telecommunications companies to also include data processed by Internet service 
providers.  
 Because of the passing of the E-Privacy Directive, member states were allowed but 
not mandated to pass data retention laws. After the passing of the Directive in 2002, 
European law enforcement agencies began lobbying to harmonize the different retention 
programs within the Union (Retzer 2006). Following the terrorist attack in Madrid of 
March 11th 2004, the EU issued the Declaration on Combatting Terrorism, a declaration 
in which the European Council expresses a strong desire to prevent future attacks: “The 
Union and its Member States pledge to do everything within their power to combat all 
forms of terrorism in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Union…” (EC 
2004: 1). One of the measures the Council instructs itself to examine is “proposals for 
establishing rules on the retention of communications traffic data by service providers”, 
proposals which it intends to prioritize and have passed by June 2005 (EC 2004: 4-5). 
The attack in Madrid didn’t create the desire to harmonize disparate data retention laws 
within the EU, but it did accelerate the process.  
The process was further accelerated a year later, when a second terrorist attack 
took place in London no July 7th 2005. In an extraordinary meeting of European 
ministers of Justice and Home Affairs took place in Brussels on July 13th, the ministers 
present issued a Declaration in which they condemned the attacks and announced 
European council “will agree the adoption of Framework Decisions on the Retention of 
Telecommunications Data” (Council of the European Union 2005a: 6). By September 
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2005, a draft proposal for a directive on data retention was submitted 15 . In early 
December 2005, the Council of the European Union agreed to reach a so-called ‘first 
reading deal’ with the European Parliament on the Directive on Data Retention by the 
end of 2005 (Council of the European Union 2005b: 15). On the 15th of March 2006, the 
Data Retention Directive EC/2006/24 was issued by the European Union.   
 
From the very start, the Directive faced critics and challenges from both outside and 
inside the EU. Some of these challenges delayed the transposition of DRD, cases brought 
before national constitutional courts against the new data retention laws being introduced 
as a consequence of the DRD in Romania, Germany and the Czech Republic saw the 
data retention laws in those countries repealed.  
In 2011, the European Union published an evaluation report to assess the DRD’s 
harmonization efforts, the concerns voiced by critics from the professionals on the side of 
the privacy narrative side regarding the proportionality and principles behind the DRD. 
Although the criticisms of the DRD did lead the Commission to call for greater 
safeguards of proportionality in future revisions of the Directive (EC 2011: 33), the 
overall assessment of the DRD was still positive. The EC reports “most member states 
take the view that EU rules on data retention remain necessary as a tool for law 
enforcement, the protection of victims and the criminal justice systems” (2011: 32). The 
report also states that Member States were very happy with the DRD: “Member states 
have generally reported data retention to be a least valuable and in some cases 
indispensable” (EC 2011: 24). According to the evaluation, member states had reported 
retained data had helped constructing evidence trails (2011: 24-5), jumpstarting criminal 
investigations (2011: 25) and been generally useful as an integral part of investigations 
(2011: 26). As a whole, the evaluation concludes that although harmonization of data 
retention laws has not been achieved (2011: 32), data retention remains an important part 
of the European Union’s efforts to fight terrorism and serious crime. In the closing 
remarks, the Commission notes: “The EU adopted the [DRD] at a time of heightened 
alert of imminent terrorist attacks. The impact assessment the Commission intends to 
conduct provides an opportunity to assess the data retention in the EU against tests of 
necessity and proportionality” (2011: 31).  
                                                        
15 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005PC0438&from=EN  
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The impact assessment foreseen in the 2011 Evaluation of the DRD would be put 
on hold in July of 2012, as it was reported that “After discussions (…) between 
Commissioners Kroes and Malmström, the decision has been taken to postpone the 
revision of the [DRD] to have it in parallel with the e-Privacy Directive”16. Earlier the 
same year, Commissioner Malmström already announced during a meeting of the 
European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs that the 
Council of Europe had no desire to revise the DRD17.  
 
In the year prior to the DRD’s invalidation of 2014, the DG Home did release document 
collating the evidence for the necessity of data retention in the EU. The document 
highlights 82 cases in which the use of historical data retained due to data retention 
policies proved useful to law enforcement investigations. The necessity and usefulness of 
data retention compared to data preservation is also reiterated: “other measures, such as 
rules on data preservation (…) whilst valuable in many ways, signally fail to provide [a 
guarantee that potentially valuable data will be available for a given amount of time] and 
as such rely wholly on the need or willingness of operators to store these data for their 
own commercial purposes, and to so in a way as to render these data accessible in time to 
investigations and prosecution” (DG Home 2013: 5).  
 Following the European Court of Justice invalidated the DRD, the legal 
framework that mandated data retention laws be passed in member states was removed. 
This has had two direct consequences: first, it has become possible for existing data 
retention laws to be challenged at the national level. The second consequence is data 
retention has been set back to the same legal level as it was in 2002 after the passing of 
the e-Privacy directive: national governments are allowed to pass data retention 
legislation but are no longer forced to do so.  
 
7.4. Driving Forces 
With regards to the passing and defence of the DRD, two driving forces play a decisive 
role. First, the heightened alertness and a strong desire to combat terrorism in the wake 
of the terrorist attacks of Madrid 2004 and London 2005. The passing of DRD in March 
of 2006 came less than two years after it was first put on the European agenda in 2004, 
                                                        
16 https://publicaffairs.linx.net/news/?p=8453  
17 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%205924%202012%20INIT (page 8) 
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with the final version of the Directive being adopted less than four months after the draft 
proposal was passed.  
The rush to pass a Directive as soon as possible is especially clear in the press 
release following the 2696th meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs ministers in 
December 2005, in which it is announced that the European Council agreed to reach a 
‘first-reading deal’ before the end of 2005. As Christian Hierholzer noted in 201318, the 
practice of first-reading agreements not only lacks transparency, they also make it 
impossible for stakeholders to provide feedback, prevents scrutiny from all parties, and 
generally threatens to undermine the quality of the legislation passed. The fact that the 
Directive was passed with such haste created many of the problems of the directive, such 
as the use of the term ‘serious crime’ which has no definition in European law. Had the 
DRD not been subject of a first-reading agreement, feedback from data protection 
agencies, service providers and other stakeholders may have brought about a much more 
robust Directive, that could have withstood the legal challenge of 2014.  
 
The second driving force behind DRD was its perceived usefulness by law enforcement 
agencies. Made especially clear in the evidence file published by the DG Home Affairs in 
2013, as well as in the 2011 Commission Evaluation, Member States found the DRD an 
essential and indispensible part of their law enforcement capabilities. Combined with the 
provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the DRD was made to guarantee 
the availability of the data to be investigated. The passing of the Directive with very 
limited feedback from a privacy narrative perspective meant that the DRD was adopted 
in a form that fulfilled security narrative preferences and goals, meaning not enough 
attention was paid to issues of proportionality safeguards, data protection concerns and 
privacy. It was the lack of these three issues that would eventually lead the European 
Court of Justice to invalidate the Directive in its entirety.  
 The popularity of the DRD in its 2006 form was also the reason the impact 
assessment and revision of the Directive planned in the 2011 Evaluation by the European 
Commission was postponed. As Commissioner Malmström indicated19, there was no 
desire in the Council of Europe to revise the DRD. Although the Commissioner provides 
no reason for this lack of desire, the evidence file and post-invalidation behaviour of 
                                                        
18 http://www.hanovercomms.com/2013/10/first-reading-agreements-faster-not-better/  
19 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%205924%202012%20INIT (page 8) 
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Member States indicates that the fact that the Member States found the DRD useful in 
the current form may have been a significant factor.  
 
7.5. Security Narrative Summary 
The invalidation of the Data Retention Directive can be traced back to the initial push for 
data retention by the security narrative in 2005. With legislators more willing than ever to 
take action to have a better chance at preventing future attacks, the privacy narrative was 
in a dominant position and the agents who favour the narrative passed the Directive with 
little to no interference from privacy narrative actors. As a result, the DRD was 
controversial from the moment it passed in 2006. Combined with the Budapest 
Convention on Cybercrime, the Directive provided law enforcement agencies with an 
incredibly useful tool to do their work.  
 In the end, however, the usefulness of the DRD to law enforcement led the 
security narrative actors to be insufficiently flexible when their dominant position 
decreased and the balance between the security and privacy narratives was restored. Had 
more time been taken to incorporate privacy narrative actor feedback into the Directive 
in 2006, more safeguards to proportionality and privacy could have been part of the 
DRD from the start. In a similar vein, if a serious effort to revise and reform the DRD 
had occurred after the European Commission’s evaluation of the Directive in 2011, the 
revised Directive may have able to withstand the 2014 Court of Justice verdict. However, 
neither of those things happened, which caused the DRD to be invalidated by a judge for 
lacking adequate privacy and proportionality safeguards.  
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8. The Privacy Narrative 
 
8.1. The Actors 
When it comes to the DRD, no shortage exists of organisations opposed to the directive 
and its implications. However, some have been more consistent in reporting on it than 
others. Since it was issued in 2006, the DRD has faced criticisms from both privacy 
watchdogs and academics. However, to only look at privacy watchdogs and academics 
would mean giving the EU itself too little credit. The Article 29 Working Party (AWP), 
an organisation formed as part of the execution of the Data Protection Directive of 1995, 
has repeatedly and consistently been critical of the DRD.  
 In addition to the AWP, a vast array of smaller, nation-based privacy and civil 
rights groups found the DRD objectionable and pushed the privacy narrative for years 
before winning the court case in 2014. Since 2002, a majority of these organisations have 
bundled their output in the form of the European Digital Rights (EDRi). EDRi has been 
one of the most quoted and used. The privacy group that won the court case against the 
DRD, Digital Rights Ireland, is also part of EDRi. Along with AWP, EDRi has been one 
of the most consistent and in-depth critics of the DRD, with responses to each of the 
three major happenings in DRD’s lifecycle of inception, evaluation, and demise. Thus, 
for the purposes of following the privacy narrative, following the publications made by 
both AWP and EDRi are necessary.  
  
The Article 29 Working Party’s genesis can be found, unsurprisingly, in Article 29 of the 
1995 Data Protection Directive 20 . The directive itself was aimed to regulate the 
processing of personal data, automated or otherwise. AWP was set up as an advisory 
organ to the European Commission, and was allowed to make recommendations 
whenever it wished to the relevant committee also established in the directive. In article 
30, it is specified that the AWP had the right to advise the European Commission on 
cases relevant to the  “[safeguarding] of the rights and freedoms of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data” (EC 1995). In other words, AWP was set up by 
the European Commission to act as an official, independent advisory organisation tasked 
with the protection of personal data. Notably, since its mandate applies to any EU law 
that handles personal data, its task extends to advising the EC on cases such as Data 
                                                        
20 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML  
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Retention, since DRD also deals with personal data. Members of the AWP are 
representatives for Data Protection Agencies from each of the EU’s member states. 
Positions held by the AWP represent the views of a majority of these representatives. As 
one may expect, AWP did indeed concern itself with analysing the DRD and its effects 
and was one of the main reasons the 2011 evaluation of DRD occurred in the first place. 
Given its position as a privacy watchdog on the inside, AWP’s opinions and 
recommendations have a much greater impact than those provided by organisations that 
are not in the loop. As with EDRi, AWP has published a multitude of reactions and 
recommendations through DRD’s lifecycle, and their contributions are vital to 
understanding the privacy narrative.  
In addition to these two organisations, this research will also incorporate analysis 
of the annual reports on Data Protection issued by the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS). Frequently cited by privacy advocates, the EDPS is in a similar vein 
to the AWP, created in a 2001 amendment to the original 1995 Data Protection 
Directive, the EDPS is an independent supervisory authority tasked with ensuring the 
faithful execution of the Data Protection Directive. The supervisor’s task is in many ways 
similar to the AWP, to independently supervise the processing of personal data (EC 
2001: 20). EDPS members are paid by the EU, and are not allowed to have side activities 
so long as they are in office.  
 
8.2. The Rise of Data Protection 
To explain why the privacy narrative was able to gain traction with regards to the DRD, 
one factor that cannot be ignored is Data Protection. As the previous section showed, 
outside of the joint force of privacy groups, the biggest critics of the DRD (and indeed 
most privacy-unfriendly legislation issued by the EU) have been two organisations that 
the EU itself set up. As the EU grew in size, influence and prominence, it has also 
increasingly sought to enshrine human rights in its legal foundation. Privacy itself has 
been part of EU charters since the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. 
Though it was never privacy at all costs, even in the 1950 ECHR, the right to privacy 
would not be infringed upon unless “in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (ECHR 1950: 
10). All of this language negating the right to privacy was absent in the 2000 Charter of 
 28 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, where Article 7 detailing Privacy simply 
read, “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications” (CFR 2000: 10).  
In addition to Article 7, Article 8 dealt specifically with Data Protection. Article 8 
reads: “1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her. 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis lay down by law. 
Everyone has the right to access data that has been collected concerning him or her, and 
the right to have it ratified. 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by 
an independent authority” (CFR 2000: 10). The CFR was ratified in 2000, but as the 
European Constitution which it was supposed to be part of failed to pass, and didn’t take 
full legal effect until the Treaty of Lisbon was signed in 2009. This does not mean 
however, that privacy law in the EU remained in legal limbo for nine years. The 
additional language on data protection, which in 2000 was already partially in place 
because of the 1995 Data Protection Directive, and the independent supervisor called for 
in the CFR Article 8 part 3 was established in 2001, when the European Data Protector 
Supervisor was created in the 2001 amendment Data Protection Directive21.  
Since early 2012, the EU has been in the process of negotiating a sweeping reform 
to the existing Data Protection Directives called General Data Protection Regulation, the 
framework for which was laid out in a 2008 Council Framework Decision in anticipation 
of the ratification of Treaty of Lisbon. The Framework Decision of 2008 intends to 
ensure further the protection of personal data, detailing the importance of proportionality 
with regards to both the collection and use of personal data in articles 1 and 322. The 
reform is still in a negotiation stage, so it is difficult to make any definitive statement on 
what the exact effects will be, or how the invalidation of the DRD will impact it. How 
the privacy narrative formulators have reacted to the GDPR’s plans will be discussed 
later in this section.  
 
In short, it is no stretch to conclude that Data Protection has been rising on the EU’s 
priority list since 1995, with significant progress being made in both 2000 and 2009. 
Advisory groups created in the Data Protection directives have been vocal, prolific and 
influential voices within the privacy narrative, so much so that even privacy advocates 
                                                        
21 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:008:0001:0022:en:PDF  
22 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32008F0977&from=EN  
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outside of the EU framework frequently cite their work and rely on comments and 
opinions by these organisations to construct their own arguments. Furthermore, going 
back to the Court of Justice’s verdict on DRD in 2014, one of the most important 
explanations for the invalidation of DRD the judge provided was the issue of 
proportionality (CJEU 2014-II). This worry falls in line with concerns expressed by 
privacy groups, but also in line with the 2008 Framework Decision, which stressed the 
importance of proportionality when it came to collecting and processing data.  
 
8.3. The Privacy Narrative Timeline 
Privacy as a fundamental right of citizens has been a major part of EU legislation since 
the Union’s inception. In the specific case of digital privacy rights, the first relevant data 
point is the passing of directive 95/46/EC, or the Data Protection Directive of 1995. The 
1995 directive is especially notable since it marked the creation of the Article 29 Working 
Party. Five years after the first steps into Data Protection, in 2000, the EU ratified the 
Charter of Fundamental rights as part of the effort to pass a European Constitution that 
same year, but since the passing European Constitution was blocked by popular 
referendums in the Netherlands and France, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
remained inactive until the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights is notable since it does give a new impulse to the EU’s privacy 
efforts, forming a direct precedent to Regulation EC 45/2001, in which the European 
Data Protection Supervisor is set up as an independent office to monitor privacy issues 
regarding personal data.  
 For this research, the narrative starts picking up steam in 2006, right after the 
implementation of Directive 2006/24/EC, the Data Retention Directive. In the wind-up 
to the Directive, privacy groups like the Foundation for Free Information Infrastructure 
referred the DRD as a ‘Big Brother’ law, and warned, “These huge amounts of data can 
be easily leaked, stolen, and abused. The forces – mainly the UK government – pushing 
the Big Brother law claim it will prevent terrorism. The FFII does not accept this 
simplistic argument. The real target, it appears, are ordinary citizens, going about their 
daily business”23. The European Digital Rights group organized a petition gathering over 
58,000 signatures in protest to the DRD to no avail, and in a press release following the 
announcement of the DRD’s adoption already announced one of it’s members’ (Digital 
                                                        
23 http://press.ffii.org/Press%20releases/EU%20introducing%20%22Big%20Brother%22%20anti-
privacy%20law%2C%20warns%20FFII  
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Rights Ireland) to take the DRD to court24. Human rights organization EAHR (European 
Association for Human Rights) expressed concern in a reaction, stating: “the content of 
[the DRD] detracts every European private life. It’s a serious violation of European 
citizens Human Rights, that will see how their rights to respect for private life and 
correspondence, as well as their presumption of innocence destroyed”25. 
 Moving on to the official organizations sanctioned by the EU, the Article 29 
Working Party was slightly less overt in its concerns than the privacy groups, expressing 
concern about the overly broad wording of the directive. AWP urged member states to 
take a number of safeguards into account, including but not limited to minimizing the 
amount of data retained, abstaining from data mining and seeking judicial approval on a 
case by case basis for accessing the data retained26.  
 
With the initial reactions, the proponents of the privacy narrative can be seen to be of 
two minds. Privacy groups entirely removed from the EU process, framing the DRD as 
the first step towards the EU as a totalitarian police state. Meanwhile, the AWP appears 
willing to assume, for now, that the DRD will live up to its mission statement, provided 
the safeguards are kept in mind. Either way, both threads of the PN will meet each other 
soon enough as the onward march of Data Protection continues and emboldens both the 
AWP and the EDPS to be increasingly critical of the DRD. It should be noted that the 
EDPS issued no formal response to the implementation of the DRD, though this may be 
explained by the fact that the supervisor was a relatively young organization at this point.  
 The next major point where many groups responded was in 2011, when the 
European Commission published its evaluation of the DRD after five years of activity. In 
short, the Commission finds that due to constitutional challenges or unwillingness, 
several member states had failed to transpose DRD-mandated laws (2011: 5-6), noting 
that several constitutional courts in members states had disallowed transposition of the 
directive (2011: 20-1), and takes note of concerns raised by the Article 29 Working party 
and EDPS about privacy concerns (2011: 30). The evaluation concludes that an impact 
assessment of DRD is to be made, which is to be used as a guideline to an eventual 
revision of the data retention directive (2011: 32-3). In an extensive shadow evaluation by 
                                                        
24 http://history.edri.org/edrigram/number4.1/dataretention  
25 http://www.aedh.eu/Directive-on-data-retention-
the.html?var_recherche=data%20retention%202006  
26 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wp119_en.pdf  
 31 
EDRi, the privacy group cites evidence from national constitutional court cases, the EU’s 
own evaluation report and reports from other EU organisations to conclude that “both 
the evaluation report of the European Commission and the shadow report of European 
Digital Rights show that the [DRD] has failed on every level. It has failed to respect the 
fundamental rights of European citizens, it has failed to harmonize the single market and 
has proven unnecessary to fight serious crime” (EDRi 2011: 20). In its final words, the 
shadow evaluation urges the EC to “reject dogmatism, reject pressure from certain 
member states and to respect the Charter on Fundamental Rights by proposing 
amendments to the Directive that reject the principle of blanket and indiscriminate 
telecommunications data retention” (EDRi 2011: 22).  
 On the official side, the EDPS published a 16-page response to the EU 
Evaluation, and its conclusions fall in line with the ones reached by EDRi, with the 
supervisor stating: “The analysis (…) justifies the conclusion that the [DRD] does not 
meet the requirements set out by the rights to privacy and data protection. It is clear that 
the [DRD] cannot continue to exist in its current form” (EDPS 2011: 14). In addition to 
this indictment, EDPS notes that the evaluation report seems not to accept repealing the 
DRD as a legitimate option. According to EDPS however, this option should remain on 
the table so long as member states fail to show the necessity of DRD. In its final 
recommendations, EDPS stops shy of calling for the rejection of DRD as a whole, 
however it does note that without reform aimed to make the directive more exhaustive, 
comprehensive and proportional, DRD has no future (EDPS 2011: 16).  
 
The invalidation of the Data Retention Directive by the European Court of Justice in 
April 2014 was well received by the parties concerned with privacy and data protection. 
In its reaction, European Data Protection Supervisor describes the ruling as a “landmark 
judgement that limits the blanket government surveillance of communications.” 27 
European Digital Rights, whose affiliate Digital Rights Ireland was one of the plaintiffs 
in the court case, quotes its executive director Joe McNamee saying “After eight years, 
this affront to the rights of European Citizens has finally been declared illegal.”28 
                                                        
27 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/PressNews/P
ress/2014/14-04-08_Press_statement_DRD_EN.pdf  
28 https://edri.org/european-court-overturns-eu-mass-surveillance-law/  
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 None of the actors however, treat the judgement of the CJEU as a complete 
victory. In its reaction to the ruling, the Article 29 Working Party wastes no time in 
calling on the EU member states to evaluate their own national laws, claiming that 
without the legal basis of DRD, national data retention laws have to comply with the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Principles of the Union “as interpreted by the 
[CJEU]”29. EDRi and Digital Rights Ireland also look towards the national level, with 
Digital Rights Ireland announcing litigation against the Irish government to remove data 
retention30 and EDRi publishing numerous news articles about the state of data retention 
laws in multiple member states. The European Data Protection Supervisor goes even 
further, stating that the European Commission may now have to consider a new directive 
preventing data retention laws at the national level, stating “The EU cannot leave the full 
responsibility for the use of data with the member states”31.  
 
8.4. Driving Forces  
There are two engines driving the narrative machine of the privacy narrative. The first 
and most important is Data Protection, the steady development of this idea since 1995 
has been instrumental to enshrine an ever-increasing amount of protections to private 
data in every major European treaty, culminating in the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. At the 
same time, privacy has always been accompanied by an economic argument when it 
comes to Data Protection. In the Data Protection Directive of 1995, equal attention is 
paid to the fundamental rights of citizens and ensuring functioning internal market in 
which data can flow freely. These two driving forces combined create a powerful 
incentive for the EU to reform and improve data protection rules. Providing details about 
the proposed reforms to data protection, the European Commission is quite clear how 
both fundamental rights and the European Single Market will be influenced by the 
upcoming reforms, stating that: “’Privacy by design’ and ‘privacy by default’ will also 
become essential principles in EU data protection rules (…) privacy-friendly default 
settings would be the norm”32, and stating that a single, European Data Protection law 
                                                        
29 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp220_en.pdf  
30 https://www.digitalrights.ie/ecj-says-eu-mandated-mass-surveillance-entails-interference-
fundamental-rights-practically-entire-european-population/  
31 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/PressNews/P
ress/2014/14-04-08_Press_statement_DRD_EN.pdf  
32 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/factsheets/2_en.pdf  
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will both cut administrative costs and “a stronger, simpler and clearer data protection 
framework will encourage companies to get the most out of the digital single market, 
fostering economic growth, innovation and job creation”33. The two data protection 
authorities that have been set up to keep watch over Data Protection, EDPS and the 
Article 29 Working Party have also been instrumental in pushing for the privacy 
narrative from a much more favourable position than outside privacy watchdogs.  
 The second major driving force backing the privacy narrative has been public 
opinion.  As TJ McIntyre, chairman of Digital Rights Ireland points out, the debate 
concerning privacy and security does not exist in a vacuum: “This is the first assessment 
of mass surveillance by a supreme court since the Snowden revelations. The [CJEU]’s 
judgement finds that untargeted monitoring of the entire population is unacceptable in a 
democratic society”34. In a similar vein, a special survey carried out by Eurobarometer in 
2011 showed Europeans favouring harmonized Data Protection Rules 90% to 7%, and 
that a small majority of 44% to 40% prefer enforcement of Data Protection at the 
European level rather than the national (2011: 187, 189). Furthermore, unfettered access 
to personal data for ‘all general crime prevention activities’ is supported by only 33% of 
respondents (2011: 203). More recent surveys show European citizens have grown 
increasingly concerned about their personal data: a cybercrime survey by Eurobarometer 
indicates that citizens worry increasingly that personal data is not stored securely by 
companies and public authorities (2015a: 97), a survey on general security shows 
Europeans feel safe, worry about terrorism, but also feel that the fight against terrorism 
and serious crime has restricted their rights and freedoms (2015b: 56).  
 
8.5. Privacy Narrative Summary 
To assert that the April 2014 ruling of the CJEU to invalidate the Data Retention 
Directive was little more than a run-of-the-mill legal interpretation of European Law is 
only partially correct. In 2009, the CJEU rejected a case brought against DRD by Irish 
and Slovenian authorities that argued the directive had been passed as an internal market 
completion measure instead of a law enforcement measure. In the ruling, the Court finds 
that “the substantive content of [the data retention directive] is directed essentially at the 
activities of service providers in the relevant sector of the internal market, to the 
                                                        
33 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/factsheets/4_en.pdf     
34 https://www.digitalrights.ie/ecj-says-eu-mandated-mass-surveillance-entails-interference-
fundamental-rights-practically-entire-european-population/  
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exclusion of State activities coming under Title VI of the European Treaty. In light of 
that substantive context, [the data retention directive] relates predominantly to the 
functioning of the internal market”35, in other words, since the DRD was directed at 
service providers rather than law enforcement, the Court found it acceptable that DRD 
was passed as an internal market completion measure. As Guild and Carrera point out 
when discussing the CJEU’s 2009 ruling: “It is striking in light of the same court’s [2014] 
judgement on the validity of the directive that it was complacent about the legal basis on 
which it was adopted. (…) There seems to be a certain inconsistency with the [CJEU]’s 
finding, which might perhaps relate to the lack (by then) of a sound fundamental rights 
treaty” (2014: 4).  
 Simply put, the 2014 ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union may 
never have happened had it not been for the continued rise of Data Protection measures, 
specifically its enshrinement as a fundamental right of citizens in the Lisbon Treaty. The 
net difference between the 2009 and 2014 rulings is five years wherein Data Protection 
became an important part of EU citizens’ fundamental rights and a rise in public 
awareness with regards to the sensitivity of personal data, in which public opinion shows 
an increasing concern for their fundamental rights vis-à-vis security.  
 
                                                        
35 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30dd0dd698e7fbc5481584ac
93d4a8e36fc7.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuQax50?text=&docid=72843&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=97865  
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9. The implications of the DRD Ruling 
In the grand scheme of the struggle between the narratives of privacy and security, the 
ruling by the European Court of Justice with regards to the Data Retention Directive 
may have an impact on other EU policies involving the retention of data. With the Court 
ruling that the mass collection of data for eventual use by law enforcement agencies is not 
permissible in the context of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. On January 7th 2015, 
digital human rights organisation Access leaked 36  a legal opinion written by the 
European Parliament legal services (EPLS) on the impact of the European Court of 
Justice ruling on the Data Retention Directive on existing international agreement with 
data retention aspects. The opinion answers questions asked to the EPLS by Claude 
Moraes, the chairman of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs.  
 Commenting on the effect of the DRD invalidation on existing EU law that 
includes requirements for mass collection of personal data, such as the Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) or the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), the ELPS notes that 
the verdict given in the case of DRD applies only to the DRD. Other EU programs, the 
ELPS writes: “enjoy a presumption of legality, and so, formally, any other EU act will 
still remain valid, irrespective of the fact that the Court declared the data retention 
Directive to be invalid (…) That said, ‘presumption’ of legality of EU acts can also be 
rebutted so it cannot be excluded, at this stage, that any other EU act could also suffer 
the same fate as the date retention Directive in a separate legal procedure” (2015: 12). 
The ELPS does also note that large parts of the CJEU ruling came down specifically to 
the wording of the DRD, making it difficult to extrapolate expected results for possible 
future court cases involving EU acts from the DRD case (ELPS 2015: 12-13).  
 When it comes to the future, however, the ELPS is quite clear: “all new and 
pending legislative proposals which concern the special context of general programmes of 
surveillance must clearly now take account of the reasoning of the Court of Justice in the 
DRI ruling” (ELPS 2015: 13). In discussing the proposed EU-PNR and Entry/Exit 
System programmes, the ELPS warns that: “Great care must therefore be taken to ensure 
that the EU legislature does not exceed its ‘reduced’ discretion in these cases and that 
adequate safeguards and objective limits are provided for, to avoid the risk that such 
legislation could later be declared ‘invalid’ by the Court, as in the DRI ruling” (2015: 13). 
                                                        
36 https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2015/01/07/leaked-european-parliament-long-awaited-legal-
study-on-data-retention  
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The ELPS also states that for the EU’s international agreements the same advice as for 
internal agreements applies (2015: 14), and that at the national level, member states make 
sure that their own data retention laws are also in compliance with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights as interpreted by the CJEU in the DRI ruling (ELPS 2015: 17).  
 
Overall, the implications of the Data Retention Directive’s invalidation could be very 
significant.  As Boehm and Cole point out in an article on the future of data retention 
after the CJEU ruling “Both PNR systems fail to comply with the most basic 
requirements the [CJEU] stipulated in the DRD judgement. The most striking imbalance 
with fundamental rights relates to the indiscriminate bulk data collection in the PNR 
systems” (2014: 89). They also find that the TFTP will need to be reassessed, since: “the 
[CJEU] requires a link between the data retained and a threat to public security as well as 
independent oversight. The current system of EU-US TFTP Agreement does not comply 
with these requirements” (2014: 97). According to Boehm and Cole, reassessment is also 
required for the Eurodac, Entry-Exit and Smart Border programmes (2014: 100, 102-
103).  
 The European Court of Justice’s ruling in the case against the Data Retention 
Directive marked the first ruling on a data retention programme since the Treaty of 
Lisbon entered into force in 2009, bringing with it the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
which had spent nearly a decade in a legal no man’s land since it had been ratified in 
2000. As a consequence, the invalidation of DRD may have far-reaching consequences 
for other EU programs that include some form of data retention, as the CJEU has made 
clear in its ruling that blanket surveillance measures are not in line with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. However, since a significant part of the ruling came as a 
consequence of the vague wording and inadequate definition of terms in the text of the 
DRD, it remains to be seen whether or not the results of the DRD case will be repeated 
when it concerns other programmes.  
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10. Conclusion 
 
In the wake of a landmark ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union, this 
research sought to answer the question: How has shift from the security narrative to the 
privacy narrative caused the demise of the Directive on Data Retention?  
By investigating the two sides of the debate between privacy and security, this 
research has found that the shift in narrative dominance from security to privacy 
professionals has indeed been very gradual. As shown in the timelines constructed for 
both sides, the eventual demise of the Data Retention Directive was hardly as set in stone 
as a simple reading of the Court of Justice of the European Union would indicate. On the 
privacy side, a steady rise of Data Protection policies looking to enshrine digital privacy 
into EU Law culminated in 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force, bringing with 
it the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Looking forward, the upcoming revision of the 
Data Protection Directive looks like another step towards the realization of far-reaching 
online privacy.  
 On the side of security, two major opportunities to create a Data Retention 
Directive that could possibly withstand legal scrutiny were missed: the first at the DRD’s 
inception in 2006, when the security professionals opted to push the Directive through 
rather than allow Data Protection agencies to provide feedback on the draft. The second 
opportunity, in 2011, was possibly even clearer, as the EC called for a revision of the 
proposal, which was subsequently postponed since the Council of Europe lacked interest 
in changing a Directive they found useful. Had either of these opportunities been taken, a 
revised version of the Data Retention Directive may very well have included sufficient 
language clarifications, Data Protection considerations and privacy safeguards to at the 
very least prevent the wholesale invalidation of the Directive in 2014.  
 
The hypothesis for this research was that the EU’s shift away from the privacy narrative 
and towards the security narrative was gradual the case of DRD. The evidence collected 
in chapters 7 and 8 indeed indicates that the shift with regards to DRD was indeed quite 
slow, so slow in fact that for a long time the European Commission itself failed to realize 
how far they had shifted towards Data Protection rather than Retention. The process is 
by no means complete, nor is it irreversible, but the EU’s growing commitment to Data 
Protection and Privacy rights over the last few years has been impressive to see, 
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especially considering that many of the Member States are not fully on board with the 
more privacy-minded approach and often seek to grow their security apparatus through 
Europe rather than through domestic means.  
 Returning to the research question, the shift from security to privacy caused the 
demise of DRD in two separate but related ways: first, the growing influence of Data 
Protection allowed for the passage of various Directives that made the necessity of 
safeguards for both Data Protection and privacy more clear. Second, as the immensely 
dominant position of the security field professionals decreased over time, they failed to 
address a number of fatal flaws in the DRD, holding on to a well-liked program for the 
short term, rather than having a compromise with the privacy professionals to create a 
Data Retention Directive with a chance at long-term viability.  
 However, in spite of these two results, the change in public opinion towards 
blanket government surveillance in the wake of the Snowden revelations has also played 
a major role in swinging public opinion in favour of more privacy-friendly regulations.  
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